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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Rueben D. Lehmann, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order 
affirming his judgment of conviction for driving without privileges. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Lehmann was cited for driving without privileges on May 11, 2015. 
(R., vol. I, p. 4.)  He was found guilty following a jury trial in magistrate court.  
(Trial Tr., p. 81, L. 18 – p. 82, L. 1.)  Lehmann appealed to the district court, 
raising a number of jurisdictional and other issues.  (R., vol. I, pp. 172-79.) 
The district court affirmed Lehmann’s conviction.  (R., vol. II, p. 326-33.)  
In doing so, it held that: 1) the magistrate had jurisdiction over Lehmann; 2) there 
was substantial evidence presented at trial that Lehmann had notice that his 
Oregon driver’s license was suspended; 3) Lehmann had waived his arguments 
that the prosecutor and magistrate had a conflict of interest; 4) the magistrate’s 
jury instructions regarding questions of law were not erroneous; 5)  Idaho courts 
do not have jurisdiction to review out-of-state court proceedings; and 
6) Lehmann failed to properly object to, and show any prejudice arising from, the 
trial transcript that was prepared.  (R., vol. II, p. 328-32.) 
Lehmann timely appealed from the judgement of the district court. 







Lehmann has not set forth a concise statement of the issues presented on 
appeal per Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4).  (See Appellant’s brief.)  His brief does 
have a heading that states “ISSUE is JURISDICTION.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 23 
(emphasis in original).) 
 As best can be gathered from the Appellant’s brief, the state would phrase 
the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court correctly find that the magistrate had jurisdiction over 
Lehmann? 
 












 The Appellant’s brief presents a variety of jurisdictional issues on appeal.  
(See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-28.)  Lehmann appears to argue that the 
magistrate, district court, and supreme court are unable to make rulings on this 
case because they are “corporate” entities that have not contracted with him.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4, 24, 26.)  He also appears to challenge jurisdiction based 
on a contention that he “only entered tribunal by special appearance.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4, 26.)  He also suggests that “Federal District Court is in 
fact the correct venue” for this case, and contends that this is a civil action.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.) 
 Lehmann’s jurisdictional arguments fail.  Application of the relevant legal 
standards shows the magistrate had jurisdiction over Lehmann. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”  State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (internal citations omitted).   
 
C. The Magistrate Had Jurisdiction Over Lehmann 
 
 Subject matter jurisdiction, broadly defined, is a court’s “power to hear and 
determine cases.”  State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 
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(2004) (citing Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950)).  
It is well settled that “[t]he information, indictment, or complaint alleging an 
offense was committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter 
jurisdiction upon the court,” and that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction to try a 
defendant and impose a sentence is never waived.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  As a general matter “once acquired by the court, jurisdiction continues 
until extinguished by some event.”  Id. (citing McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho 
198, 199, 766 P.2d 133, 134 (1988); Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 41, 
720 P.2d 223, 224 (Ct. App 1986).) 
 Personal jurisdiction is the “court’s power to bring a person into its 
adjudicative process.”  State v. L’Abbe, 156 Idaho 317, 321, 324 P.3d 1016, 
1020 (Ct. App. 2014).  The state of Idaho “has personal jurisdiction over any 
person who commits all or part of a crime within its territory.”  I.C. § 18-202(1); 
L’Abbe, 156 Idaho at 322, 324 P.3d at 1021 (citing Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 
91 P.3d at 1132).  An Idaho court hearing a criminal case “acquires personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant after his or her first appearance in that case.”  
L’Abbe, 156 Idaho at 322, 324 P.3d at 1021.  Pursuant to the state constitutional 
provision vesting judicial power in the courts, but granting the legislature the 
ability to prescribe lower-court jurisdiction, the Idaho Code establishes a 
magistrate court division and gives it, among other things, the power to hear 
misdemeanor cases.  Idaho Const. art. V, § 2; I.C. §§ 1-2201, 2208(3)(a). 
 The magistrate here had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
over Lehmann.  Lehmann was charged with driving without privileges in the state 
 
 5 
of Idaho.  (R., vol. I, pp. 131-32.)  Lehmann personally appeared at the pretrial 
conference.  (R., vol. I, pp. 112-13.)  The magistrate therefore had both personal 
jurisdiction over Lehmann and subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.  See 
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132; L’Abbe, 156 Idaho at 322, 
324 P.3d at 1021. 
 As noted by the district court below, many of Lehmann’s jurisdictional 
challenges have already been addressed by the L’Abbe Court. Lehmann 
appears to argue the Idaho courts are “corporate” bodies, and that the court 
below is an “Administrative Corporate Court with no contract or evidence of 
association” with him, thus lacking jurisdiction.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24, 26, 
28.)  This theory was expressly addressed, and rejected, by the court in L’Abbe.  
See 156 Idaho at 318-21, 324 P.3d at 1017-20.  The L’Abbe Court instead 
reaffirmed that “the creation and the authority the State of Idaho has, is derived 
from both the people of the state and the national government,” with judicial 
power vested in the state judiciary by Idaho’s Constitution.  Id.  Lehmann also 
argues that he only made a special appearance in this case, appearing to imply 
that the magistrate had no personal jurisdiction over him.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
p. 25.)  But the L’Abbe Court rejected a similar argument when it found “the 
magistrate court acquired personal jurisdiction over L’Abbe when he appeared at 
the pretrial conference.”  Id. at 322, 324 P.3d at 1021.  Here, Lehmann appeared 
at the pretrial conference, and the magistrate therefore had personal jurisdiction 
over him.  (R., vol. I, pp. 112-13.) 
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 To the extent they can be discerned, Lehmann’s remaining jurisdictional 
challenges fail.  Lehmann appears to argue that Oregon officials lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed against him in the original license suspension action.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 2.)  However, Idaho courts do not have jurisdiction to review 
Oregon judicial proceedings.  Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; I.C. § 1-204.  Lehmann 
also appears to argue that this is a civil action that should be heard in federal 
district court.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.)  These arguments, beyond being 
unsupported by coherent argument or authority, fail on the merits: this appeal 
stems from a state-court criminal action and Lewis County was the proper venue.   
I.C.R. 19 (“Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the 
prosecution shall be had in the county in which the alleged offense was 
committed.”) 
 Lehmann has failed to show that the magistrate court did not have 
jurisdiction over him and over this case.  The district court therefore properly 
dismissed his jurisdictional claims. 
II.  
Lehmann’s Remaining Arguments Do Not Show Error Below 
 
A. Introduction 
 The Appellant’s brief alleges a variety of other legal errors below.  These 
claims appear substantially similar to those presented to the district court on 
intermediate appeal.  (Compare Appellant’s brief, with R., vol. II, pp. 234-79.)  




B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court directly reviews the district court’s decision when the district 
court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity.  State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 
145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  This Court reviews the magistrate record “to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law 
follow from those findings.”  Id.  “If those findings are so supported, and the 
conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s 
decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as a matter of 
procedure.”  Id.; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Found That There Was Sufficient Evidence 
For The Jury To Conclude Lehmann Had Notice Of His Oregon Driver’s 
License Suspension 
 
 Lehmann argued below, and appears to argue on appeal, that there was 
insufficient evidence that he had notice of his Oregon driver’s license 
suspension.  (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-21; Appellant’s brief, p. 30.) 
 The district court rejected this claim, noting first that the Idaho Code holds 
drivers responsible for notifying the Idaho Department of Transportation of any 
address change.  (R., vol. II, p. 328 (citing I.C. § 49-320).)  Furthermore, “[a] 
person has knowledge that his license, driving privileges or permit to drive is 
revoked, disqualified or suspended when,” among other things, he received oral 
or written notice of the suspension, or, 
 
 8 
[n]otice of the suspension, disqualification or revocation of his 
license, driving privileges or permit to drive was mailed by first class 
mail to his address pursuant to section 49-320, Idaho Code, as 
shown in the transportation department records, and he failed to 
receive the notice or learn of its contents as a result of his own 
unreasonable, intentional or negligent conduct or his failure to keep 
the transportation department apprised of his mailing address. 
 
I.C. § 18-8001(2).  Consequently, “notification by first class mail at the address 
shown on the application for a driver’s license or at the address shown on the 
driver’s license or at the address given by the driver, shall constitute all the legal 
notice that is required.”  I.C. § 49-320.   
 Here, the evidence adduced at trial was that notice of the Oregon license 
suspension was sent to Lehmann at “PO Box 7315” in Boise, Idaho.  (Trial Tr., 
p. 53, Ls. 16-22; State’s Ex. 1.)  The notice itself states it is a “REGISTER OF 
SUSP/CANC/REV NOTICES/LETTER SENT BY FIRST CLASS MAIL,” and 
bears a certification that it was mailed on April 10, 2014.  (State’s Ex. 1, p. 3.)  
The officer who cited Lehmann testified that this notice had “the same mailing 
address of information that I’ve received from [Lehmann],” and testified the 
notice contained “a receipt of an official letter being sent for the notice of 
suspension to the residence of the said pages before.”  (Trial Tr., p. 52, Ls. 11-
12; p. 53, Ls. 16-18.)1 
 The evidence presented at trial showed that notice of the Oregon 
suspension was mailed to Lehmann.  The district court accordingly correctly 
concluded that “[t]he jury had substantial evidence presented from which they 
                                            
1 And, as the district court noted, this is “the same address that Lehmann has 
used on his pleadings.”  (R., vol. II, p. 331; see, e.g., R., vol. II, p. 235.) 
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could conclude that Lehmann received notice” of the suspension.  (R., vol. II, 
p. 331.)  Lehmann has failed to show the district court erred. 
 
D. The District Court Correctly Found That Lehmann Failed To Show A 
Conflict Of Interest Between The Magistrate And The Prosecutor Below 
 
 Lehmann argued below, and appears to argue on appeal, that the 
magistrate and the prosecutor had a conflict of interest.  (See, e.g., R. vol. I, 
p. 176; Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)  His claim is that “overwhelming evidence 
presented reveals a ‘conflict of interest’ by the way Judges and 
government personnel are receiving compensation and benefits from the 
revenue extorted (directly or indirectly), by revenue agents (police, clerks 
and etc.) into the treasury of the corporate government.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 26 (emphasis in original).)  Lehmann states that this conflict of interest “Bars 
Jurisdiction.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 26 (emphasis in original).) 
 The district court rejected Lehmann’s conflict-of-interest claims on 
intermediate appeal, noting that “Lehmann did not support this issue with law, 
authority or cogent argument, thereby waiving this issue.”  (R., vol. II, p. 331 
(citing Colafranceschi v. Briley, 159 Idaho 31, 355 P.3d 1261, 1265 (2015).)  On 
appeal, Lehmann has failed to cogently argue or otherwise show that the district 
court erred in its conclusion.   He has therefore again waived these claims on 
appeal, because he has failed to support his arguments with propositions of law, 
argument, or authority.  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 




E. The District Court Correctly Found That The Magistrate Did Not Err In 
Instructing The Jury 
 
 Lehmann argued below, and appears to argue on appeal, that the 
magistrate erred by not instructing the jury that they could judge “the application 
of law” in reaching a verdict.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (emphasis in 
original).)  Lehmann’s argument on this point took the following form at trial: 
[Prosecutor]: … Judge Calhoun asked this, and I apologize for the 
repetition, but I think it’s an important one here. As he’s explained, 
if you are selected to sit on the jury you must follow the Court’s 
instructions regardless of your opinion of what the law should be. 
And I just want to, by a show of hands, will everybody promise to 
apply the law as the Judge instructs you? 
 
MR. LEHMANN: Your Honor, I object to that statement. The jury 
has a right to judge the law. 
 
THE COURT: Actually, that’s not the procedure in courts of law in 
the United States, Mr. Lehmann. That is an incorrect statement, 
and so I’m going to overrule the objection after that. 
 
MR. LEHMANN: It’s under — 
 
THE COURT: Mr. Lehmann, I’ve ruled on it. You need to be quiet, 
please. 
 
(Trial Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-19.)  Lehmann reiterates on appeal that “No fully 
informed jury was allowed, only judging the facts and not the application of 
law, in violation of the 7th Amendment and Supreme Court rulings.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (emphasis in original).) 
 The district court rejected this claim, correctly noting that it directly 
contradicted the Idaho Code.  (R., vol. II, p. 331.)  The applicable statute 
provides that: 
[A]lthough the jury have the power to find a general verdict, which 
includes questions of law as well as of fact, they are bound, 
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nevertheless, to receive as law what is laid down as such by the 
court. 
 
I.C. § 19-2131; see also Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 710, 429 P.2d 836, 840 
(1967) (noting the “jury decides questions of fact in criminal trials”) (citing State v. 
Blacksten, 86 Idaho 401, 407, 387 P.2d 467, 470 (1963)); State v. Hoagland, 
39 Idaho 405, 228 P. 314, 318 (1924) (“The jury is bound by the instructions of 
the court.”). 
 On appeal, Lehmann has failed to show the district court’s jury instruction 
ruling was erroneous.  The district court correctly found that the magistrate’s jury 
instructions were appropriate. 
 
F. The District Court Correctly Rejected Lehmann’s Challenge To The 
Transcript 
 
 Following Lehmann’s jury trial, after the lodging of the trial transcript on 
intermediate appeal, Lehmann filed a “NOTICE OF DISTORTION 
TRANSCRIPT.”  (R., vol. II, pp. 282-89.)  In it, he contended that the trial 
transcript “is deficient in several areas some of which have a distinct 
bearing on this case.”  (R., vol. II, p. 282 (emphasis in original).)  Lehmann 
went on to allege a series of purported errors or missing words in the settled 
transcript, apparently based on a comparison of the transcript to an audio CD 
recording of the trial.  (See R., vol. II, pp. 209, 212-13, 283-87.) 
 The district court ruled on Lehmann’s notice in its Opinion affirming the 
jury verdict.  (R., vol. II, p. 331.)   It construed the “NOTICE OF DISTORTION 
TRANSCRIPT” as an objection to the transcript, but, noted that Lehmann “did 
not notice it for a hearing.”  (R., vol. II, pp. 331-32.)  The district court therefore 
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found that per I.R.C.P. 83(o), Lehmann “lost his opportunity for the trial court to 
hear the objection by not noticing it for a hearing,” and consequently, the court 
had no evidence of a distorted transcript.2  Moreover, the court found that 
“Lehmann has not demonstrated how the alleged distortions prejudiced him.”  
(R., vol. II, p. 332.) 
 Lehmann raises the transcript issue on appeal, arguing that: 
Paul did not rebut Lehmann’s Evidence of Distortion in the 
transcript, making all Court records unreliable. Transcript 
manipulation is evidenced as part of the record. Lehmann’s 
presentment by law stands as truth. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 19 (emphasis in original).)3  Lehmann also filed a “NOTICE 
OF DISCREPANCY” with this Court, alleging that “[a] manipulated transcript 
of jury trial has been sent to the Supreme Court,” and again alleging that 
because there was no objection to the similar notice below, the suggested 
changes to the transcript “have been accepted.”  (Notice of Discrepancy, p. 1 
(emphasis in original).)  The notice avers that a “Copy of CD enclosed on 
Transcript of Jury Trial for the record into the Court of Appeals to the 
Supreme Court,” and notes that “CD of Jury Trial is key to verifying of the 
                                            
2 The court’s reference to I.R.C.P. 83(o) is misplaced.  In a civil action, Rule 83(i) 
provides the mechanism by which parties may challenge trial transcripts on 
intermediate appeal.  In a criminal action such as this one, Idaho Criminal Rule 
54.9 gives the parties the ability to object to the transcript.  In any event, the 
language of the two sections is substantially similar, and both sections state that 
such an objection shall be “heard and determined by the trial court in the same 
manner as a motion.”  I.C.R.P 83(i); I.C.R. 54.9. 
 




tampering with evidence in the transcript.”  (Notice of Discrepancy, p. 2 
(emphasis in original).) 
 Lehmann has failed to show the district court erred below.  First, the court 
ruled that even if Lehmann’s notice was construed as an objection to the trial 
transcript, he failed to notice it up for hearing.  (R., vol. II, pp. 331-32.)  Per the 
criminal rules, and the incorporated civil rules governing filing motions,4 parties 
“must indicate on the face of the motion whether oral argument is desired,” and if 
so, must also file “the notice of hearing for the motion.”  I.C.R. 54.9; I.C.R. 49(c); 
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A), (D).  Lehmann’s notice did not request any argument, nor 
was it noticed for a hearing, at which time he could have presented evidence of 
his claims.  (See R., vol. II, pp. 282-89.)  In light of his failure to request a 
hearing, Lehmann cannot show the district court erred by not hearing his notice.5 
                                            
4 The criminal rules provide that objections to transcripts prepared for 
intermediate appeal “shall be heard and determined by the trial court in the same 
manner as a motion.”  I.C.R. 54.9.  The “manner” of filing criminal motions can 
be found in Idaho Criminal Rules 47 and 49.  The latter states that “[d]ocuments 
required to be served”—such as motions—“shall be filed with the court.”  I.C.R. 
49(c).  It also provides that “[d]ocuments shall be filed in the manner provided in 
civil actions.”  I.C.R. 49(c).  Thus, objections to the record must likewise be filed 
in the manner provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
5 Lehmann’s substantively similar “NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY,” filed with this 
Court on appeal on November 17, 2016, fails for similar reasons.  To the extent 
Lehmann wishes to object to the transcript on appeal, the Idaho Appellate Rules 
provide that “[a]ny objection made to the reporter’s transcript or clerk’s or 
agency’s record must be accompanied by a notice setting the objection for 
hearing and shall be heard and determined by the district court or administrative 
agency from which the appeal is taken.”  (I.A.R. 29(a) (emphasis added).)  Even 
if one were to construe Lehmann’s appellate-level “notice” as an objection to the 
record, it was not filed with the court below, nor does it appear that Lehmann 
noticed any hearing on the matter.  (See generally, R., vols. I – II.)  As a result, 
Lehmann’s “notice” was ineffective as an objection to the transcript on appeal. 
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 Alternatively, even if Lehmann was not procedurally required to notice his 
objection for a hearing, the court’s ruling was also based on a substantive 
conclusion that “[f]urther, Lehmann has not demonstrated how the alleged 
distortions prejudiced him.”  (R., vol. II, p. 332.)  On appeal, Lehmann has not 
provided cogent argument or authority on appeal to show that this conclusion 
was incorrect, because he has not shown how any of the alleged 
“inconsistencies” or “manipulations” of the transcript would affect any of the 
issues on appeal. (See Notice of Discrepancy.)  The district court therefore 
correctly concluded that Lehmann’s notice of alleged distortions, for both 
procedural and substantive reasons, should not be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 27th day of January, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_______ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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